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Abstract
We study a general barter market where every agent is
endowed with several heterogeneous indivisible items
and wishes to exchange. There is no medium of
exchange like money. Agents have general preferences
over their interested bundles of items and may acquire
several items. We propose a practical and sensible solu-
tion called a Markovian core, generalizing the classi-
cal notion of the core. A Markovian core allocation is
individually rational, Pareto-efficient, and stable against
any coalition deviation by comparisonwith their current
assignments instead of their initial endowments and is
shown to be a natural outcome of a decentralized mar-
ket process.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This article aims to investigate a general barter market with multiple heterogeneous indivisible
commodities and establish an innovative, practical, and reasonable solution to this class of mar-
kets. In recent years, bartermarkets have attracted attention far beyond their traditional boundary
of economics; see, for example, Gewertz (1978), Pearson (2003), Argumedo and Pimbert (2010),
andYe et al. (2018). Thesemarkets are undoubtedly the oldest formofmarkets throughwhich peo-
ple exchange their commodities and services without using money or any medium of exchange.
© 2021 Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Nowadays, they are still widely used and spreading into various new territories such as online
peer-to-peer trade and human organ exchange. A great advantage of these markets is that they
can avoid using money. Bartering gains popularity when money is tight, and bartering is neces-
sary when money is not allowed. For instance, according to Mickey Meece’s report in the New
York Times (November 12, 2008), barter exchanges had double-digit increases in membership in
2008 due to the financial crisis. Countries that are short of international currencies (see, e.g.,
Bank, 1985) or want to avoid using international currencies often swap their commodities and
services. It is also fairly common to see that developed nations exchange their industrial products
for natural resources from developing nations. Financial companies frequently swap their assets.
Howell and Chmielewski (2009) reported that more than 70,000 businesses make cashless trans-
actions annually throughout the USA. A new development of the barter trade is organ exchange.
In almost all countries, human organs are not permitted to sell or to buy but can be donated or
mutually exchanged.
Marshall first studied barter exchange in the second half of the 19th century and later devoted
one chapter to the theory of barter exchange in Marshall (1952). In response to Marshall’s idea
of barter exchange, Edgeworth (1881, 1925) formulated a market process for a simple barter econ-
omy with two perfectly divisible goods. Uzawa (1962) extended Edgeworth’s process to a general
economy with multiple perfectly divisible goods and proved that his continuous price adjustment
process could reach equilibrium under certain conditions. Mukherji (1974) further examined the
Edgeworth–Uzawaprocess underUzawa’s conditions and found that the path of price vectors gen-
erated by the process has a unique limit, which is an equilibrium of the economy. These authors
defined an equilibrium of the barter market as the limit of a continuous price adjustment process.
This is in marked contrast to Walrasian equilibrium and core that are defined on the primitives
of the economy.
The barter market of Shapley and Scarf (1974) stands out as a celebrated model in the fields of
microeconomics and cooperative game theory. The top trading cycle (TTC) procedure described in
their paper has found important applications in mechanism design, two-sided matching, kidney
exchange, and school choice, etc. In this market, there are finitely many traders or agents each
of whom owns initially an indivisible item, for example, a house. Every agent has preferences
over all the houses but has no use for more than one item. There is no money or other medium of
exchange. Agents swap their houseswith each other to obtain their favorite possible houses. Shap-
ley and Scarf (1974) proved that this market is a balanced nontransferable utility (NTU) game and
therefore has a nonempty core by a theorem of Scarf (1967), and both core allocation and a com-
petitive equilibrium can be found by the TTC procedure. Since then, many remarkable properties
of this model and the procedure have been discovered.
Roth and Postlewaite (1977) demonstrated that if every agent has strict preferences, this market
has a unique competitive equilibriumcoincidingwith the unique strict core allocation. Roth (1982)
proved that the TTC procedure can induce every agent to behave honestly. Wako (1984) illustrated
that the strict core can be a proper subset of the set of competitive equilibrium allocations. Qin
(1993, 1994) took the possibility of randomization of coalitions into account and proposed the solu-
tion of the inner core as a refinement of the core. Ma (1994) proved that under strict preferences,
a procedure is individually rational, Pareto-efficient, and strategy-proof if and only if it is the TTC
procedure. Konishi et al. (2001) studied a generalization of the Shapley–Scarf model by allowing
each agent to initially own, say, one house and one car. They demonstrated that many distinctive
features of the Shapley–Scarf economy cannot carry over to this extended model. But they found
that if there are only three agents and all agents have additively separable strict preferences, then
the core of this market is not empty. Inoue (2008) examined an extension of the Shapley–Scarf
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model and established that if the aggregate upper contour set of all agents is discretely convex,
then the core is nonempty and that especially if the upper contour set of every agent is𝑀-convex
the core is not empty.
In stark contrast to the markets with perfectly divisible goods which always have a nonempty
core in general environments (see Scarf, 1967; Arrow & Hahn, 1971) and to the markets with indi-
visible goods and quasi-linear utilities inmoneywhich admit competitive equilibria under several
regular conditions (see Kelso & Crawford, 1982; Bikhchandani & Mamer, 1997; Ma, 1998; Gul &
Stachetti, 1999; Sun & Yang, 2006, 2014; Baldwin & Klemperer; 2019), the core of markets with
indivisibility which are more general than the Shapley–Scarf market can easily become empty.
The difficulty is caused both by the absence of money and by the presence of indivisibility which
is an extreme form of nonconvexity. For instance, Shapley and Scarf (1974, pp. 32–34) themselves
showed the nonexistence of core in an apparently natural market with three agents having sym-
metric holdings in a tract of nice houses. In their example, agent 𝑗 owns houses 𝑗, 𝑗′, and 𝑗′′ for
𝑗 = 1, 2, 3. Moulin (1995) pointed out that the core generally does not exist in the market where
each agent owns a car and a house and views cars and houses as complements. Konishi et al.
(2001) demonstrated that the core can be empty even in the class of economies with several iden-
tical items and agents consumingmultiple units. In such economies, there is no complementarity
among the items. Inoue (2008, pp. 102–103) gave a different type of example with an empty core.
The notion of the core cannot be used as a solution to many markets where agents initially
possess more than one item andmay acquire several items and for which the core is generally not
guaranteed to be nonempty. It is, therefore, necessary to find an appropriate alternative solution
to such markets. On the one hand, as the core is one of the most important solution concepts
in the context of competition and cooperation, it will be important for any proposed solution to
maintain some basic properties of the core such as individual rationality, Pareto-efficiency, and
stability. On the other hand, any proposed solution has to be general enough to handle a variety of
situations. To achieve this, the conditions imposed on the core, such as full rationality, will have
to be appropriately relaxed. We aim to establish such a solution for a general barter market.
In this paper, we study a general barter market in which each agent is initially endowed with
several inherently indivisible items andwishes to exchangewith other agents. There is nomedium
of exchange like money. Agents have general preferences over their interested bundles of items
and may acquire several items. Unfortunately, the core as a widely recognized solution cannot
be applied to this general market because it can be empty and void. However, in practice, barter
trade does take place in volume and on a large scale. So there is a gap between the existing theory
and reality.
To bridge the gap and have a better understanding of the nature of the market, we attempt to
explore a more practical approach by taking human behavioral aspects and cognitive factors such
asmyopia, impatience, and bounded rationality into consideration and propose a constructive and
sensible solution called a Markovian core. This new solution not only meets those criteria men-
tioned above but also fits the context of barter markets well, because barter trade happens often
when money is short or not allowed. In such (sometimes desperate) situations, agents usually
want to get an immediate improvement of their current position andmay not have enough time or
even try to think about how to achieve the best from all possible potentially beneficial exchanges.
This can lead them to act myopically and hastily and therefore not necessarily optimally or fully
rationally. Briefly speaking, our solution can be described as follows. Every Markovian core allo-
cation is individually rational with respect to their initial endowments, Pareto-efficient, and stable
against any coalition deviation by comparison with their current assignments instead of their ini-
tial endowments. We prove that the market has always a nonempty strict Markovian core. A strict
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Markovian core allocation will be shown to be a natural outcome generated by a decentralized
market process. This result offers a plausible explanation for the very existence of a variety of
barter markets. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a natural random decentralized process con-
verges almost surely to a strict Markovian core allocation.
In a nutshell, our paper introduces a large class of general bartermarkets with indivisible goods
in which the widely used solution-core fails to exist. We propose a new, practical, and reasonable
solution called the Markovian core and establish its existence and shed light on the existence of
many real-world barter markets. Our arguments are simple and intuitive.
The rest is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 establishes the main
results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 MODEL
Consider a general barter market in which there are 𝑚 agents and n different types of indivis-
ible commodities. Let 𝑀 = {1, 2, … ,𝑚} denote the set of agents. Each agent 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀 is initially
endowed with a nonzero bundle 𝜔𝑗 ∈ Z𝑛+ of indivisible items and has a general preference rela-
tion ⪰𝑗 on a family of possible consumption bundles 𝐹
𝑗 ⊆ Z𝑛+ containing his initial endowment
𝜔𝑗 , where Z𝑛+ represents the space of indivisible commodities, that is, the collection of all nonneg-
ative n-dimensional integer vectors. Both 𝐹𝑗 and ⪰𝑗 depend on the agent and may vary from one
agent to another. The preference relation⪰𝑗 is assumed to be complete and transitive. There is no
medium of exchange like money in the economy. As the imposed condition is mild and minimal,
the model is very general, substantially extending that of Shapley and Scarf (1974) in which every
agent 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀 is endowedwith one item 𝑒(𝑗)—the 𝑗-th unit vector in IR𝑚 and has the consumption
set 𝐹𝑗 = {𝑒(ℎ) ∣ ℎ ∈ 𝑀}. We use 𝐸 = (⪰𝑗 , 𝜔
𝑗 , 𝐹𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) to represent our current general market.
All agents try to swap their items in order to improve their welfare.







𝑗 and 𝑥𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝑗 for every 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀. At allocation 𝑋, agent 𝑗 receives
bundle 𝑥𝑗 .
This market can be naturally formulated as an NTU cooperative game. The conventional solu-
tion to this kind of game is the notion of the core (see Scarf, 1967). It is defined to be a set of
redistributions of all items among all agents that cannot be profitably blocked by any coalition of
agents by comparing with their initial endowments. A coalition is a nonempty subset of the set
𝑀.
Definition 1. An allocation (𝑥𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) is a core allocation if there do not exist a coalition 𝑆






𝑗 such that 𝑥𝑗 ≻𝑗 𝜔
𝑗 and 𝑥𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝑗 for all
𝑗 ∈ 𝑆. An allocation (𝑥𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) is a strict core allocation if there do not exist a coalition 𝑆 and an






𝑗 such that 𝑥𝑗 ⪰𝑗 𝜔
𝑗 and 𝑥𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 with
at least one strict inequality.
Shapley and Scarf (1974) considered a market in which each agent initially owns one item like
one house, has preferences over all items, but has no use for more than one item. They showed
that this market has a nonempty core.
Because the core is not guaranteed to be nonempty, it cannot be used as a solution to many
markets where agents initially possess more than one item and may acquire several items, and it
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is therefore necessary and useful to find an appropriate alternative solution to such markets. It
will be important for such a solution to possess at least individual rationality, Pareto-efficiency,
and stability. The Markovian core to be introduced has these desirable properties. From the clas-
sical notion of the core (Definition 1), we understand that every agent has to be totally rational,
infinitely patient, and fully capable of cognitive thinking and computing and to have a whole
and clear picture of the entire market and that every member in every possible blocking coalition
always compares with his initial endowment. Unlike this classical solution, the proposed solution
has to relax some of these assumptions by taking both incomplete information, human myopic
behavior, impatience, and bounded rationality into account.Wemay imagine an economicmilieu
in which people initially own several items and wish to exchange with each other. At the begin-
ning, they may not know everyone except their neighbors and friends but they gradually get to
know each other as time goes on. They may be myopic or not patient enough but just want to
grab every opportunity to improve their current position. In this process, agents haggle with each
other and exchange with each other as long as improvement can be made. Agents act rationally
at the moment they exchange but not necessarily optimally or fully rationally if the whole process
is taken into account. When trade happens, ownership will automatically change hands. Owing
to possible exchanges of ownerships, the traditional core definition must be adapted to this fact.
Trade terminates until none have incentive to trade any further. The final state of the market pro-
cess may well be seen as a natural solution for stability. There is a tradition of treating an equilib-
rium of an economy as a final state of certain market process. For instance, following Edgeworth
(1881), Uzawa (1962) directly defined the equilibrium of a barter economy with perfectly divisible
goods to be the final state of his continuous price adjustment process. In the current paper, we
will not only introduce a new solution concept in a similar way as Walrasian equilibrium and
core are defined on the primitives of the market but also show that this new solution will be a
natural outcome of a market process.
Definition 2. An allocation (𝑥𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) is strongly 𝑀-blocked by a coalition 𝑆 if there exists






𝑗 and 𝑦𝑗 ≻𝑗 𝑥
𝑗 and 𝑦𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆. An allocation







and 𝑦𝑗 ⪰𝑗 𝑥
𝑗 and 𝑦𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 with at least one strict inequality.
In the definition, 𝑆will be called an𝑀-blocking coalition of𝑋. We use the𝑀-blocking coalition
in order to differentiate it from the classical notion of blocking coalition: 𝑆 is a blocking coalition






𝑗 and 𝑦𝑗 ⪰𝑗 𝑥
𝑗
and 𝑦𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 with at least one strict inequality.
An allocation (𝑥𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) is individually rational if, for every agent 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀, 𝑥𝑗 is at least as good
as his initial endowment 𝜔𝑗 .
Definition 3. An allocation is aMarkovian core allocation if it is individually rational and cannot
be strongly M-blocked by any coalition. An allocation is a strict Markovian core allocation if it is
individually rational and cannot be𝑀-blocked by any coalition.
By definition, a Markovian core allocation is individually rational with respect to the initial
endowment of every agent. This property is shared with the classical notion of core. The cur-
rent definition of 𝑀-blocking coalitions with at least two members is similar to that in the clas-
sical core (Definition 1) but differs from the latter in one major aspect that the current definition
6 FUJISHIGE and YANG
requires agents in each blocking coalition to compare the proposed assignments (𝑦𝑗) with their
current assignments (𝑥𝑗) instead of their initial endowments (𝜔𝑗). OurMarkovian core allocation
is Pareto-efficient and immune from any possible coalition deviation by comparing with every
coalition member’s current assignment and captures some behavioral aspects and limited ability
of human decision-making. That we use the term of Markovian core is to try to reflect behind
the model a process of decision-making in which agents make their decision rationally but not
necessarily optimally at every time based solely on their present states.
3 EXISTENCE RESULTS
An allocation (𝑥𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) is a Pareto-improvement of an allocation (𝑦𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) if 𝑥𝑗 ⪰𝑗 𝑦
𝑗 for all
𝑗 ∈ 𝑀with at least one strict inequality. An allocation (𝑥𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) is a strong Pareto-improvement
of an allocation (𝑦𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) if 𝑥𝑗 ≻𝑗 𝑦
𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀. An allocation is strongly Pareto-efficient
if it has no Pareto-improvement. An allocation is Pareto-efficient if it has no strong Pareto-
improvement. Our first theorem shows that the market has a nonempty strict Markovian core.
It will be proved constructively as a natural outcome of a successive Pareto-improvement market
process. Our arguments for the following two results are simple and intuitive.
Theorem 1. The market 𝐸 = (⪰𝑗 , 𝜔
𝑗 , 𝐹𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) has a nonempty strict Markovian core.
Proof. We prove this by constructing a finite number of successive Pareto-improvements. Imagine
that the market opens at day 0 with the initial market state 𝑋0 = (𝜔𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀). We also denote it
by 𝑋0 = (𝑥0,𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀). If 𝑋0 is not a strict Markovian core allocation, then there must exist an
𝑀-blocking coalition 𝑆1 with (𝑦𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆1) against 𝑋0. Then we (𝑥𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) obtain a newmarket
state 𝑋1 = (𝑥1,𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) on day 1 with 𝑥1,𝑗 = 𝑦𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆1 and 𝑥1,𝑗 = 𝜔𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀 ⧵ 𝑆1.
Clearly, 𝑋1 is a new allocation at which none is worse than his initial state and at least one is
strictly better off. So 𝑋1 is a Pareto-improvement of 𝑋0. Again, if 𝑋1 is not a strict Markovian core
allocation, there must exist an 𝑀-blocking coalition 𝑆2 with (𝑦𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆2) against 𝑋1. We have a
new allocation 𝑋2 on day 2 being a Pareto-improvement of 𝑋1. We repeat this process until there
is no𝑀-blocking coalition anymore. This is a monotonic process and must stop in finite time as
the number of allocations is finite. Therefore, the market must have a nonempty strict Markovian
core. □
The above theorem shows that a strict Markovian core allocation exists in a very general barter
market. It might lead some casual reader into thinking that the strict core can be very similar to
the strict Markovian core. In fact, it is not. To see this point, we will use the following example of
Shapley and Scarf (1974, section 5) to show that when agents are indifferent between some items,
the strict core can be empty.
Example 1. There are three traders. Trader 1 initially owns house ℎ1, trader 2 house ℎ2, and trader
3 house ℎ3. Their preferences over the houses are given by
⪰1= ℎ2, [ℎ1, ℎ3]
⪰2= [ℎ1, ℎ3], ℎ2
⪰3= ℎ2, [ℎ1, ℎ3].
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This means that traders 1 and 3 prefer house ℎ2 to both houses ℎ1 and ℎ3 but are indifferent
between the latter two houses, while trader 2 are indifferent between houses ℎ1 and ℎ3 but prefers
both to house ℎ2.
In this market, there are four core allocations: 𝜋1 = (ℎ1, ℎ3, ℎ2), 𝜋
2 = (ℎ2, ℎ1, ℎ3), 𝜋
3 =
(ℎ2, ℎ3, ℎ1), and 𝜋
4 = (ℎ3, ℎ1, ℎ2). It is easy to see that 𝜋
1 is blocked by coalition {1, 2}, 𝜋2 by {2, 3},
𝜋3 by {2, 3}, and 𝜋4 by {1, 2}. Consequently, there is no strict core allocation in the market.
The proof of Theorem 1 motivates us to consider a natural market process. A sequence (𝑋𝑠 ∣
𝑠 = 0, 1, … , 𝑡∗) of allocations in the market 𝐸 = (⪰𝑗 , 𝜔
𝑗 , 𝐹𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) is said to be a sequence of
successive Pareto-improvement market states if 𝑋𝑠 = (𝑥𝑠,𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) for every 𝑠 = 0, 1, 2, … , 𝑡∗ with
𝑋0 = (𝜔𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) and 𝑋𝑠 is a Pareto-improvement of 𝑋𝑠−1 for 𝑠 = 1, 2, … , 𝑡∗ and there is no
Pareto-improvement of 𝑋𝑡
∗
. 𝑋0 is called the initial market state and 𝑋𝑡
∗
the final market state.
Because there are only a finite number of allocations in the market, this sequence must be finite.
Any market process which generates such a sequence is called a successive Pareto-improvement
market process. Clearly, any such market process must terminate in a finite number of iterations.
Then the following result follows immediately.
Remark. The final market state generated by any successive Pareto-improvement market process
for the market 𝐸 = (⪰𝑗 , 𝜔
𝑗 , 𝐹𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) is a strict Markovian core allocation.
This shows that the strict Markovian core allocation is a practical and sensible solution as it is
an outcome generated by a natural decentralized successive Pareto-improvement market process.
It should be noted that the basic idea of barter process is due to Edgeworth (1881) albeit for a simple
economy with two perfectly divisible goods. For the models of Edgeworth (1881), Uzawa (1962),
and Mukherji (1974) with perfectly divisible goods, prices are continuously adjusted to balance
demand and supply of each good. In contrast, for our current model with indivisible goods, the
market process has to adjust quantities of each good among traders involved. More precisely, in
our market process as long as the market has not reached an equilibrium namely, a strict Marko-
vian core allocation, anM-blocking coalitionwill emerge andmembers in the coalitionwill adjust
their currently holding bundles among themselves so that at least one member in the coalition
will get better off and none in the coalition becomes worse off. Members outside the coalition
maintain their status quo. This adjustment results in a Pareto-improvement.
Now we consider a very practical and realistic situation where agents may not have a clear and
complete knowledge of the whole market but are somehow well-informed in a sense that as long
as there will be opportunities for some coalition of agents to improve themselves, this coalition
can grasp such opportunities with a positive probability. To be precise, the market opens at day
0 with every agent coming with his initial endowment. Trade takes place everyday 𝑡 = 0, 1, …, as
long as agents can find opportunities to exchange and improve themselves. As agents do not have
a complete knowledge of the market, we can only impose a mild condition upon the economy
that on each day 𝑡, every blocking coalition should occur with a positive probability.
Theorem 2. Assume that the market 𝐸 = (⪰𝑗 , 𝜔
𝑗 , 𝐹𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) starts at day 0 with every agent 𝑗 ∈
𝑀 endowed with 𝜔𝑗 and that on each day 𝑡 = 0, 1, …, every 𝑀-blocking coalition happens with a
positive probability. Then themarketwill converge almost surely to a strictMarkovian core allocation.
Proof. We prove this by constructing a finite random process of successive Pareto-improvements.
Imagine that the market opens at day 0 with the initial market state 𝑋0 = (𝜔𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀). We also
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denote it by 𝑋0 = (𝑥0,𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀). If 𝑋0 is not a strict Markovian core allocation, then there must
exist an𝑀-blocking coalition against 𝑋0. By hypothesis, we may take 𝑆1 as a realized𝑀-blocking
coalition with (𝑦𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆1) against 𝑋0 with a positive probability. Then we (𝑥𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) obtain a
new market state 𝑋1 = (𝑥1,𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) on day 1 with 𝑥1,𝑗 = 𝑦𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆1 and 𝑥1,𝑗 = 𝜔𝑗 for all
𝑗 ∈ 𝑀 ⧵ 𝑆1. Clearly,𝑋1 is a new allocation at which none is worse than his initial state and at least
one is strictly better off. So𝑋1 is a Pareto-improvement of𝑋0. Again, if𝑋1 is not a strictMarkovian
core allocation, there must exist a realized𝑀-blocking coalition 𝑆2 with (𝑦𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆2) against 𝑋1
with a positive probability. We have a new allocation 𝑋2 on day 2 being a Pareto-improvement of
𝑋1. We repeat this process until there is no 𝑀-blocking coalition anymore. This is a monotonic
process andmust converge almost surely to a strict Markovian core allocation in finite time. More
precisely, because of the finite number of market states and the assumption of the theorem, there
exists a positive  such that every 𝑀-blocking coalition happens with probability greater than
a fixed common  > 0. Hence the probability of the infinite sequence of no occurrence of 𝑀-
blocking coalitions is equal to zero since (1 − )𝑛 converges to zero as n goes to infinity. So an
𝑀-blocking coalition occurs at a finite time instance 𝑡 with probability one, and then after 𝑡 this
process repeats as many times as possible till we reach a strict Markovian core allocation with
probability one. □
The interested reader may refer to Chen et al. (2016), Fujishige and Yang (2017), Kojima
and Ünver (2008), and Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for different random market processes.
4 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a general barter market with many heterogeneous indivisible
items. Every agent is initially endowed with multiple items and may acquire several items. There
is no medium of exchange like money. Agents have general preferences over their interested bun-
dles of items. This model reduces to the well-known model of Shapley and Scarf (1974) and has a
nonempty core when every agent is initially endowed with one item and has no use for more than
one item. However, it is well known that the core of such an economy is typically empty when
every agent is allowed to acquire more than one item. We have proposed a practical and appeal-
ing solution to this general resource allocation problem called a Markovian core, generalizing the
classical solution of the core. AMarkovian core allocation is individually rational, Pareto-efficient,
and immune from any possible coalition deviation by comparison with their current assignments
instead of their initial endowments. This solution has relaxed the requirement of full rational-
ity and infinite patience of the classical notion of the core by taking incomplete information and
some human behavioral aspects and cognitive factors, such as myopia, impatience, and bounded
rationality, into account.We have shown that themarket has always a nonempty strict Markovian
core. A strictMarkovian core allocation is proved to be an outcome of a natural decentralizedmar-
ket process. This result provides a plausible explanation as to why barter markets widely exist in
a variety of circumstances. Furthermore, we have proved that a random decentralized process
converges almost surely to a strict Markovian core allocation.
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